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NOTE
EXPANDING FORFEITURE WITHOUT
SACRIFICING CONFRONTATION
AFTER CRAWFORD
Joshua Deahl*
I love

murder cases; you have one less witness to worry about.
-Murray Richman, defense lawyer
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I N TROD U CTION
The central holding of

Crawford
3

v.

2
Washington

is fairly straightforward:

The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of out-of-court testimonial
statements unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
4
witness. Crawford, however, has an often overlooked caveat. In renouncing
numerous exceptions to the confrontation right, the Court rejected only
those that purport to test the reliability of testimonial statements. It left equi
table exceptions undisturbed. As the Court pointed out, "[T]he rule of
forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation
5
claims on essentially equitable grounds."
The parameters of the rule of forfeiture are a matter of some dispute. As
opposed to a waiver, which requires a knowing and intelligent relinquish
ment of a right, forfeiture occurs when an individual commits an act
inconsistent with maintaining a right. 6 It has traditionally applied in witness
tampering cases, where a defendant intimidates, bribes or kills a witness just
before she is scheduled to testify. In those situations, forfeiture should bar
the defendant from successfully objecting to the admission of the witness's
prior unconfronted testimony.
To illustrate, consider a defendant who is charged with running a large
7

drug operation. The day the prosecution's key witness is to testify, he is
killed on the way to the courthouse. Luckily for the prosecutor, the witness
already gave testimony implicating the defendant before a grand jury, and
the prosecutor now seeks to admit it in lieu of the witness's in-court testi

mony. Let us assume that there is no question that the defendant played a
role in killing the witness; he admits it. Nevertheless, he objects, "The Sixth
Amendment grants me the right to confront this witness, and since I have
not been afforded that right, this unconfronted testimony should be ex
cluded." The rule of forfeiture prevents this objection from succeeding,
since it was the defendant who caused the unavailability of the witness. As
one authority explained, applying the rule of forfeiture effectively says to
the defendant, "You have no valid complaint about the loss of a right that, as

2.

541 U.S. 36 (2004).

The Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, "In all criminal
3.
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4.

As the Court noted, "Where testimonial statements

are

at issue, the only indicium of

reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes:
confrontation." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. Courts have focused on flushing out this rule, with
particular attention paid to outlining exactly what constitutes a testimonial statement, as the Court
explicitly left that issue unresolved. Id. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.' ").
5.

Id. at 62 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878)).

6.

See Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1214, 1214 (1977).
7. This fact pattern is modeled after United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir.
1982). To be exact, evidence showed that Mastrangelo was involved in the importation of 23.4 tons
of marijuana and 499,000 methaqualone tablets.

Id. at 271.
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a natural and desired result of your own conduct, it is impossible to afford
,,8

you.
Before

Crawford, only when a defendant acted to silence a witness to a
prior crime would courts apply forfeiture.9 The rule operated as a disincen
10
tive to keep organized crime affiliates from "knocking off'' witnesses. But
as one judge succinctly put it, "Crawford heightens the importance of . . .
11
the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing." In the brief period of time since
Crawford was decided, a number of courts have extended the rule's reach to
instances where the wrongdoing that makes a witness unavailable is identi
12
cal to the defendant's alleged crime, while several courts have declined the
13
invitation. The California Supreme Court recently granted review to an
swer the question, "Does [forfeiture] apply where the alleged 'wrongdoing'
14
is the same as the offense for which defendant was on trial?" This has been

8. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of ChutlJJa, 31 IsR . L. REV. 506,
518 (1997) [hereinafter Friedman, ChutlJJa]. A more common way of stating the principle, albeit
slightly less pointed, is that "one not be permitted to profit from one's own wrongdoing." People v.
Cotto, 642 N.Y.S.2d 790, 793 (App. Div. 1996); see also 5 JOHN HENRY WJGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
ThiALS AT COMMON LAW§ 1390 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1974) ("Where . . . the failure to
obtain cross-examination is in any sense attributable to the cross-examiner's own consent or fault,
the lack of cross-examination is of course no objection.") (emphasis in original).
9. See James F. F lanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness
Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REv. 459, 482 (2003) (surveying case law and concluding that forfeiture
"has only been used when the defendant specifically intended to prevent the witness from testifying
at trial ").
10. Id. at 466-72 (describing the modem doctrine as arising with the Organized Crime Act
of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, and the development of the Witness Protection Program).
11.

United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 916 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J. dissenting).

12. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2005). In Garcia-Mew,
the Sixth Circuit noted:
There is no requirement that a defendant who prevents a witness from testifying against him
through his own wrongdoing only forfeits his right to confront the witness where, in procuring
the witness's unavailability, he intended to prevent the witness from testifying. Though the
Federal Rules of Evidence may contain such a requirement, see FED. R. Evrn. 804(b)(6), the
right secured by the Sixth Amendment does not depend on, in the recent words of the Supreme
Court, "the vagaries of the Rules of Evidence."

Id. at 370; People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1 (Colo. App. 2004); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004);
Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. App. 2004). A line of cases decided in California Courts of
Appeal in the last year has shown this same willingness, prompting the California Supreme Court to
review the questions arising from them. See People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843 (Ct. App. 2004),
review granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. Dec. 22, 2004); People v. Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790 (Ct. App.
2004), review granted, 103 P.3d 270 (Cal. Dec. 22, 2004); see also People v. Taylor, No. A095412,
2005 WL715973 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2005); People v. Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, No. Crim. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501 (D. Colo.
Mar. 3, 2005); United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137-1, 2004 WL1631675 (N.D. Ill. July 16,
2004); State v. Wiggins, No. 99 CRS 46567, 2005 WL 857109 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2005);
State v. Ivy, No. W2003-00786-CCA-R3-DD, 2004 WL 3021146 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2004).
14. People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Dec.
22, 2004).
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referred to as applying forfeiture "reflexively," 15 and I will borrow the term
throughout this Note.
A reflexive application of forfeiture occurs whenever a defendant is
charged with the very act that allegedly made the witness unavailable. Con
sider a defendant (D) who is charged with murder. Just before death, the
victim calmly told the police, "I would like to report that D inflicted this
potentially fatal injury upon me."16 The prosecutor may then seek to admit
this testimony at D's murder trial-although D has not had the chance to
confront the victim--on the grounds that D forfeited his confrontation right
by killing the victim.

Post-Crawford courts have been somewhat receptive to
7
this rather innovative application of forfeiture.1
This extension of the rule would understandably be an unwelcome de

velopment for a number of jurists. One judge responded to suggestions that
forfeiture ought to apply reflexively by saying, "It's almost frivolous to ar
gue forfeiture in this case . . .. I wouldn't have given anybody five minutes

to argue forfeiture."18 Nevertheless, it may have been exactly what the Su
preme Court intended when it mentioned the rule of forfeiture in Crawford
and described it as an equitable principle.19 After all, the only brief that men
20

tioned forfeiture explicitly advocated this reflexive application of it.
This Note argues that forfeiture ought to apply reflexively and that there
is no principled way to limit the doctrine-as

pre-Crawford

courts had-to

witness-tampering cases. Forfeiture should apply whenever a defendant's
wrongdoing caused a witness's unavailability. Extending forfeiture in this
way could drastically alter the way certain crimes are prosecuted. Unavail-

15.

See Friedman, Chut(JJa, supra note 8, at 508.

1 6. The reason why I frame it as a calm police report is just to make clear that it would be
testimonial under Crawford, the implications of which I describe in Part I.
1 7. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The most illustrative case is Meeks, 88 P.3d
789. In that case, an officer rushed to the scene of a shooting, and asked the victim who shot him, to
which the victim replied, "Meeks shot me." Id. at 792. The trial court admitted the statement prior to
the ruling in Crawford under an evidentiary rule that was almost certainly inapplicable post
Crawford. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the conviction, holding that the
defendant had forfeited his confrontation right by killing the witness, despite the fact that his
wrongdoing was not targeted at silencing a witness.
18. This was the statement of Judge Avem Cohn of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, after judging a moot court round featuring an argument in favor of applying
forfeiture in this way. His reactions to the argument, and the round which discussed forfeiture at
some length, can be viewed at http://www-personal.umich.edu/-shawndel/campbell.htm (last vis
ited July 24, 2005). This particular statement was made approximately one hour and twenty six
minutes into the recording.
19.

Crawford v. Washington, 54 1 U.S 36, 62 (2004).

20. See Amicus Curiae Brief, Law Professors Clark, et al., Crawford (No. 02-94 10), avail
able at 2003 WL 21754958 (July 24, 2003) [hereinafter Law Professors' Brief]. Addressing
forfeiture, the brief argued:
If the trial court determines as a threshold matter that the reason the victim cannot testify at
trial is that the accused murdered her, then the accused should be deemed to have forfeited the
confrontation right, even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the
one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable.
Id. at *24 n. 16 (citing Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 8).
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able victims who were intimidated by the crimes against them, such as do
mestic abuse

victims, could have their prior unconfronted testimony

admitted based on forfeiture findings.
Beyond revisiting the arguments in favor of the reflexive application of
forfeiture, this Note adds a new layer of analysis. It requires looking at a
hybrid case. It is different from the two hypotheticals described above inso
far as it includes both witness tampering and reflexive application of
forfeiture. The case I have in mind involves a witness coming forward to the
police and reporting, "D is engaged in a large drug operation, and he threat
ened to kill me if I cooperated with the police." When the witness is
subsequently killed, prosecutors seek to admit this statement against D, not
in his trial for running the drug operation, but in his trial for murdering the
witness. The reason for discussing this third type of case is that it requires
the reflexive application of forfeiture-but even pre

-

C rawford

courts were

typically willing to apply forfeiture reflexively so long as it involved a fact
pattern like this one. This suggests that courts are not opposed to applying
forfeiture reflexively in any principled way. Instead, there is likely an alter
native explanation that captures why courts are willing to apply forfeiture
reflexively in witness-tampering cases but are reluctant to do so under other
circumstances.
Part I of this Note sets the stage by briefly reviewing

Crawford

and its

implications for the rule of forfeiture. Part II argues that forfeiture ought to
apply reflexively and that the reason why courts are reluctant to apply it as
such is not because of a principled objection to it, but for an alternative,
purely evidentiary reason. That is, evidence of forfeiture's occurrence is
likely to be particularly strong in witness-tampering cases. Part III considers
the potentially vast ramifications of applying forfeiture so expansively, as it
threatens to extinguish the right to confront critical witnesses in a variety of
cases. Part Ill, therefore, also suggests some principled limitations to the
rule. I argue that two limitations-a narrow interpretation of witness un
availability and a bar on bootstrapping testimonial evidence-should largely
allay the concerns of jurists worried about the expansion of forfeiture. I con
clude that while forfeiture should be substantially limited to protect the
vitality of the Confrontation Clause, it should not be restricted to witness
tampering cases. After rejecting this limitation, which has needlessly preoc
cupied courts and commentators,

we should expect more

defensible

constraints to develop.
I. How
While

CRAWFORD CALLS FOR A NEW APPROACH TO FORFEITURE

Crawford

largely revamped and clarified Confrontation Clause

analysis, it also called the scope of forfeiture into question. This may come
as a surprise, since the language of

Crawford

appears to have done nothing

Michigan Law Review
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2
more than reaffirm the rule of forfeiture in passing. 1 It becomes necessary
to review the changing face of the Confrontation Clause post-Crawford
alongside the rule of forfeiture to understand how forfeiture is due for a
makeover.
Before Crawford, Ohio v. Roberts22 provided the predominant frame
work for interpreting the Confrontation Clause. Under Roberts, the
Confrontation Clause was concerned with all statements made by out-of
23
court declarants. Noting, however, that confrontation was aimed at testing
the reliability of these statements, a defendant's confrontation right could be
satisfied if the witness was unavailable and the contested statement con
24
tained "adequate 'indicia of reliability.' " These indicia were usually found
25
within "firmly rooted hearsay exception[s]."
For example, one firmly
rooted hearsay exception is the dying declaration, which allows the admis
sion of hearsay statements in homicide prosecutions if they are "made by a
declarant while believing that the declarant's death was imminent, concern
ing the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be
2
impending death." 6 The peculiar rationale for this exception is that "[n]o
person who is immediately going into the presence of his Maker will do so
27
with a lie upon his lips."
Crawford drastically altered this framework in two principal ways. First,
2
it held that the Confrontation Clause concerns only testimonial statements. 8
While the parameters of what constitutes a testimonial statement were not
precisely drawn, it is enough for our purposes to know that "(a]n accuser
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a
sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
29
not." In other words, the Court gave substance to what it means to be a
"witness against" somebody, such that Sixth Amendment protection applies
only if the out-of-court declarant can fairly be described as bearing witness.
21. To reiterate, the Court's only mention of the rule came when it said, "[T]he rule of forfei
ture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable
grounds. . ." 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
22.

448 U.S. 56 (1980).

23.

Richard D. Friedman,

24.

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.

25.

Id.

26.

FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2).

27.

Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 1, 3 (Eng. N. Wales Cir. 1881). This rationale is

Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JusT. 4, 5 (2004).

strange, to say the least. I am reminded of a sketch by a comedy troupe, The Kids in the Hall, that
somewhat captured the fallacy behind this explanation. After a defendant took the stand in his own
defense and blatantly lied in response to every question, the prosecutor reminded him that he was
under oath. In response, the defendant quipped, "Oh right. And I would never lie under oath-not to
God." The Kids in the Hall: The Murder Trial (HBO television broadcast 1991), transcript available
at http://www.kithfan.org/work/transcripts/three/suspicsn.html (last visited July 24, 2005). See also

RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF EVIDENCE 327-32 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN,
EVIDENCE) (providing a more in-depth discussion of the peculiarities of this exception).
28.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-53 (2004).

29.

Id. at 51.
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Second, once it is determined that a statement is testimonial, a judicial find
ing that the statement is reliable will not satisfy a defendant's confrontation
3°
right. Confrontation is the constitutionally prescribed procedure for testing
the reliability of testimony, and there can be no substitute for that method,
even when a witness becomes unavailable. Crawford narrowed the scope of

the Confrontation Clause, applying it only to testimonial statements; it also
strengthened it, renouncing exceptions to the rule that purported to be surro
gate tests for reliability. The Confrontation Clause is now a "smaller mouth
3
[with] bigger teeth." 1
But the rule after Crawford is not as clear cut as it appears to be. In not
ing that confrontation is a constitutionally required check on the

reliability

of testimonial statements, the Court stated that it was renouncing only those
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that purported to assess the reliabil
32
ity of testimony. The Court noted that forfeiture remains a valid exception
to the Confrontation Clause, as it is an equitable principle unconcerned with
33
the reliability of the statements at issue. That is, when it is the defendant's
own fault that she cannot confront a witness, she loses her confrontation
right regardless of the testimony's reliability. The Court's reference to the
rule of forfeiture is odd, if for no other reason than the Supreme Court has
rarely mentioned it in its opinions. Despite dating back to the seventeenth
4
centu
and more recently being codified in the Federal Rules of Evi

q/

5 the rule of forfeiture had been mentioned in only one other
36
Supreme Court opinion in the past seventy y ears.
The mention of forfeiture was more than a trivial passing reference.

dence,

While prior exceptions to the inadmissibility of hearsay have been largely
eviscerated when testimony is at issue, forfeiture remains intact because it is
not a gauge for reliability. As a result, prosecutors eager to admit testimonial
evidence have become rather innovative in arguing for an expansive

30.

Id. at 53-56.

31.

W. Jeremy Counseller & Shannon Rickett,

Washington:

The Confrontation Clause After Crawford v.
Smaller Mouth, Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (2005).

32.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. Another example of such an exception is the "excited utter
ance" exception to the rule against hearsay. See FED. R. Evm. 803(2) (1980). The justification for
admitting such excited utterances is that "a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the
capacity of reflection . . . produces utterances free of conscious fabrication." FED. R. Evm. 803
advisory committee's notes. Before Crawford, these hearsay exceptions applied indiscriminately to
both testimonial and non-testimonial statements. Indeed, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, any
statement-testimonial or otherwise--demonstrating "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness" was an exception from the rule against hearsay under certain conditions. FED. R.
Evm. 807.

33.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.

34.

See Lord Morley's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769 (H.L. 1666).

35.

FED. R. Evm. 804 (b)(6) (amended 1997).

36.

See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-47 (1970). It was mentioned in five decisions
prior to Allen. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934); Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S.442, 452-53 (1912); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 472-74 (1900); Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878).
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37
forfeiture -since they often have little other recourse in tryin to admit
3
unconfronted testimony-and courts have been pretty receptive. Given the
new approach to the Confrontation Clause, overlooking the emerging impor

�

tance of forfeiture could be a serious mistake.
The analysis here aims at exploring the outer reaches of the rule of for
feiture, as confined by the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution. Even if
the Constitution permits a finding of forfeiture, though, testimony may still
be excluded under the Federal Rules of Evidence or under any given state's
9
3
evidentiary code. A plain reading of the Federal Rules may restrict the ap
plication of forfeiture reflexively, as it applies only when a defendant
"intended to . . . procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness,"
40
although this language is not entirely clear. Thus, if a prosecutor success
fully argues that a defendant can reflexively forfeit his confrontation right
under the Constitution, she will still have to contend with the evidentiary
41
rules, since they may provide broader protection for a defendant. Courts
have specifically noted that the dimensions of forfeiture may be different in
42
the Federal Rules and state codes of evidence than in the Constitution. I
will not explore the extent of these potential differences, as the analysis here
targets the constitutional dimensions of forfeiture.
JI. EXPANDING FORFEITURE BEYOND WITNESS-TAMPERING CASES
There is an unnoticed trend in the forfeiture case law that should lead us
to accept its expansion beyond witness-intimidation cases. This

Part

aims at

37. See, e.g., Adam M. Krischer, "Though Justice May Be Blind, It ls Not Stupid": Applying
Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, PROSECUTOR, Nov. -Dec. 2004, at 14.
38.

See supra notes 12-13; irifra Part II.A.

39. In stressing the disjunction between the Rules of Evidence and the Constitution, the
Court stated, "[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to
leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence." Crawford v. Wash
ington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see also 4 DAVID w. LoUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE§ 4 18, at 123 ( 1980) ("Few tasks in criminal evidence are more perplexing than
to describe the effect of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment upon the hearsay doc
trine.").
40. See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(6). While this could be read to limit forfeiture to witness
intimidation cases, it is a matter for debate. Usually when somebody commits murder, we might
accurately say that she intends to keep her victim from coming forward as a witness, even though
we probably would not describe it that way. While surely that is not her only motivation-since she
might just as easily do that by not committing the murder in the first place-most murderers cer
tainly see the absence of their victims as an intended benefit.
4 1. For a reading of the statutory history behind Rule 804(b)(6) that would lend support to
interpreting it as only applying to witness-intimidation cases, see generally Leonard Birdsong, The
Exclusion of Hearsay Through Forfeiture by Wrongdoing-Old Wine in a New Bottle-Solving the
Mystery of the Codification of the Concept into Federal Rule 804(b)(6), 80 NEB. L. REV. 891
(200 1), and Flanagan, supra note 9.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that the court
"need not worry about any potential differences between the substantive forfeiture standards . . .
under [the] two provisions " as the defendant had only raised the hearsay issue). For an in-depth
discussion about how one state's code of evidence differs from the Federal Rules with regard to
forfeiture, see State v. Henry, 820 A.2d 1076, 1085-91 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
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exploring that trend in the hopes of determining the proper scope of the rule
along with some limitations. In Section II.A, I review three different scenar
ios where forfeiture might apply and how courts have responded to that
suggestion. The cases demonstrate that, while courts sometimes object to
the reflexive application of forfeiture, it is actually well-accepted under the
proper circumstances. Sometimes courts will only apply forfeiture if the
defendant was motivated by a desire to procure a witness's unavailability,
while in other cases they seem entirely unconcerned by the defendant's mo
tive. Likewise,

some courts

appeal to maintaining a presumption of

innocence in refusing to apply forfeiture reflexively, but that concern disap
pears under certain fact patterns for no discernible reason. Therefore, in
order to make sense of the cases, we will need an alternative explanation for
when courts are reluctant to apply forfeiture.
In Section 11.B, I argue that the explanation is that courts are really only
concerned with two limiting principles:
in a relatively narrow set of cases, and

(1) that forfeiture should be applied
(2) only upon strong evidence of its

occurrence. Accepting these as basic precepts underlying forfeiture should
allow us to develop a more coherent approach to the rule and put the cases
in perspective.
A.

Three Applications of Forfeiture: Revealing a Trend

Many courts are willing to apply forfeiture reflexively in some situa
tions, but not in others, and a closer look reveals that there is no principled
distinction between the situations that justifies this disparity. An illustration
should help ground the analysis. Victim 1 (V1) has been fatally shot, but just
before he dies, he finds a police officer and makes Statement 1, "D shot
me." Having witnessed the shooting, Victim 2 (V2) goes to the police and
gives Statement 2, "D threatened to kill me if I cooperate with the police,"
and Statement 3, "I saw D shoot V/' V2 is subsequently killed just before
she is scheduled to testify at trial. Assuming that there is enough evidence
for a judge to find that D committed both the killings as a preliminary mat
43
44
ter,
there are three questions
we should ask with regard to the
constitutionality of applying forfeiture:

43.
This is an assumption that I will be making throughout the analysis in Part II, but one
that should not ordinarily be taken for granted. Of course, that both victims implicated D in their
murders-V, at least did so speculatively-does not mean that D is guilty. How much discretion
judges should have to make these determinations and what safeguards we should have in place is the
subject of Part III, infra. But for now, the assumption is that there is ample evidence for a predicate
finding that D committed both killings.
Most courts have held that a predicate finding of forfeiture should be made under a "prepon
derance of the evidence " standard. See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's notes for 1997
amends. (listing cases that apply the preponderance test, and offering only one case that applied a
clear and convincing standard). But see United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. Unit B
1982) (requiring clear and convincing evidence).
44.
Since there are three statements and two trials in the hypothetical, there are technically
six potential ways forfeiture could apply. However, we need not consider the other three possible
combinations, as they would be either redundant or uninteresting. Also, the more accurate-but Jess
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l. Could (V/s) Statement 3 be admitted in D's trial for murdering V,?
2. Could (V2's)Statement 2 be admitted in D's trial for murdering V2?
3. Could (V,'s)Statement 1 be admitted in D's trial for murdering V,?

Courts addressing the constitutionality of these questions have unani
mously answered "yes" to Question 1, as the Supreme Court has explicitly
45
authorized this application of forfeiture. Similarly, an overwhelming ma
jority of courts have answered "yes" to Question 2, despite the fact that it
requires reflexive application of forfeiture. This puts the numerous courts
and commentators answering "no" to Question 3 in a predicament. They
must either

(1)

object to reflexive application of forfeiture, putting them at

odds with the vast majority of courts answering "yes" to Question 2, or (2)
come up with some justification for applying forfeiture reflexively in sce
nario 2 but not in scenario 3. Courts have been unable to do this because
there is no principled explanation for this discrepancy. A closer look at the
three questions should help demonstrate this.
1. The

Classic Case for Forfeiture

The first question is the easiest to answer: Forfeiture will preclude D's
objection to the admission ofV/s statement, "I saw D shootVI " at his trial
'
for killingV1• This has been settled as a constitutional matter for more than
a century. In other words, where a defendant's wrongful actions prevent a
witness to a prior crime from testifying, he has forfeited his right to confront
that witness in his trial for the initial crime.

The Supreme Court already settled this question in Reynolds v. United
46
States. Reynolds was on trial for bigamy, and one witness against him-his

second wife-previously testified about the bigamy offense in an earlier
trial. When the court officer contacted Reynolds in an attempt to serve a
subpoena upon his second wife, Reynolds would not divulge her location.
Instead, he stated, "[T]hat will be for you to find out . .. . She does not ap
47
pe?.r in this case." The Court, finding that Reynolds had kept his wife from
testifying, held that when a defendant "voluntarily keeps the witnesses
48
away, he cannot insist on his [confrontation] privilege." Notably, the Court
never undertook any consideration of Reynolds' purpose, apparently indif
ferent to the motivations underlying his obstructionism. While the Supreme
concise-form of the questions would be, "Does forfeiture preclude D's confrontation-based objec
tion to the admission of Statement

X

in his trial for murdering Vx ?"

45.

Reynolds v. United States,

46.

Id.

98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878).

47.

Id. at 160.

48.

Id. at 158. A court addressing a case like this today would likely have no occasion to

reach the issue of forfeiture, because it appears that Reynolds had a full opportunity to examine the
witness at his prior trial for the same offense. Id.; see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59
(2004) ("Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opponunity to cross
examine."(emphasis added)).
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49
Court has not made much use of the doctrine, every Circuit to address the
50
issue has recognized this application of forfeiture.
As in Reynolds, the courts addressing similar scenarios give little to no
51
attention to the defendant's underlying motives. Indeed, if one places much
importance on them, the results are absurd. Assume D killed V2 not to keep
her from testifying about V1's murder, but solely to get revenge when he
found outV2 cooperated with the police in their investigation of him. How
could that possibly count in D's favor when balancing the equities? To place
any importance on this motive, a court would have to effectively say, "You
would not be able to object to the admission of this testimony had you killed
V 2 to keep her from testifying, but since you killed her only to get revenge,
your objection is allowed and V/s testimony is precluded notwithstanding
the fact that you killed her." A court clinging to this distinction could not be
viewed as one concerned with equity, but only with a contrived formal limi
tation. As the Sixth Circuit found, "[t]he Supreme Court's recent affirmation
of the 'essentially equitable grounds' for the rule of forfeiture strongly sug
gests that the rule's applicability does not hinge on the wrongdoer's
52
motive." While some courts espouse such formal limitations in other con
texts, none has done so in a case where the victim witnessed a prior crime,
gave testimony about it, and was then precluded from testifying by the de
53
fendant's wrongdoing.
Thus, we can safely answer "yes" to Question 1 without further consid
eration of D's motives.
2. Reflexive Application

of Forfeiture in Witness-Tampering Cases

Forfeiture should, and typically will, preclude D from successfully ob
jecting to the admission of V/s statement, "D threatened to kill me if I
cooperate with the police," at his trial for killing V2• If there were a princi
pled objection to applying forfeiture reflexively, it would sound in this
second

type

of

case.

However,

while

Question

2

is

slightly

more

49.
tioned).

See supra note 36 (counting a total of six cases in which the doctrine was even men

50.
See FED. R. Evm. 804 advisory committee's notes to 1997 amend. ("Every circuit that
has resolved the question has recognized the principle of forfeiture by misconduct, although the
tests for determining whether there is a forfeiture have varied."); see, e.g., United States v. Aguiar,
975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629
(10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358-59 (8th Cir. 1976).
51. See id. (citing five cases with similar fact patterns, none of which gave much considera
tion to the defendant's motives in procuring the witness's absence).
52. United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005); see also United States
v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 916 (6th Cir. June 21, 2005) (quoting this same language).
53. At least one case, in dicta, stated that the defendant's motivation behind procuring a
witness's absence could be of decisive importance, even in witness-intimidation cases. See, e.g.,
State v. Hinson, No. M2000-02762-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31202134, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Sept. 27, 2002) ("Even intentional misconduct, such as killing a witness, does not qualify unless
done for the purpose of procuring the witness's unavailability. ") Notably, that court was not inter
preting the constitutional limitations of forfeiture, but those under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.
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controversial than the first, an overwhelming majority of courts have an
54
swered its equivalent in the affirmative.
The question posed is whetherV/s statement, "D threatened to kill me if
I cooperate with the police," is admissible in D's trial for killing V2 on the
grounds that D forfeited his right to confront her. While the question might
seem far-fetched, there is no shortage of cases posing nearly identical sce

55

narios. For instance, a similar fact pattern arose in United States v. Dhinsa.
In that case, after Manmohan Singh provided the police with information

regarding numerous crimes Gurmeet Dhinsa had committed, he further
stated that he was afraid that Dhinsa would kill him-and had threatened to
do so--for cooperating with the police. After Singh was killed, his state
ments that Dhinsa had threatened to kill him were admitted in Dhinsa's trial
56
for Singh's murder. The Second Circuit, agreeing with the majority of
courts addressing similar scenarios, found no problem with applying forfei
57
ture under these circumstances.
This question is both similar and different to Question 1 in important
ways. It is similar insofar as it involves tampering with a witness to a prior
crime.V2 had witnessed D's slaying ofV1 and made testimonial statements
about it before D killed him. And for the same reasons stated above, it
would be misguided for a court to become preoccupied with D's motives for
slaying Vi- But it is different from the scenario in Question

1,

since D is

now on trial for the same wrongdoing that caused the forfeiture of his right
to confrontVi- In this case, the court's forfeiture finding depends on deter
mining that D murderedV2 as a predicate matter, and then the court must try
D for the same murder ofV2•
That there are two identical issues to be decided-first as a predicate
matter and then at trial--does raise concerns. One court recently articulated
the typical objections:

54. See, e.g., United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying forfeiture re
flexively in a murder trial when the victim had contacted the police about some of defendant's
illegal activities and defendant subsequently ordered him killed after learning about it); United
States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the defendant's objection that forfeiture
should only apply for "the underlying crimes about which he feared [his victim] would testify, not in
a trial for murdering her."); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997) (same); United
States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1278-81 (!st Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d
983, 993-95 (I Ith Cir. 1985) (finding that forfeiture applied in a defendant's murder case, where he
committed the murder upon finding out that his victim was an undercover informant); United States
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 627-33 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (admitting murder victim's prior testimony
when one of the three charges against the defendant was the murder of that victim). But see United
States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 426--27 (E.D. Va. 2002) (rejecting the reflexive application of
forfeiture even though the government argued that the murder in question was done in order to pro
cure the witness's unavailability in a divorce proceeding).
55.

243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001).

In one of his appellate briefs-<:oauthored by Alan M . Dershowitz-Dhinsa argued that
56.
this was the most important evidence against him regarding Manmohan Singh's murder. Reply Brief
of Defendant-Appellant Gurmeet Singh Dhinsa at 9, Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (No. 99-1682) ("The
most important . . . evidence was testimony by Manmohan's emotional, grieving father that Man
mohan said that [Dhinsa] had threatened to kill him-evidence used by the government as evidence
that the defendant did have Manmohan killed.").
57.

Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 649-58.
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[The] Defendant is being tried under well settled Constitutional principles,
[therefore] Defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. To
hold otherwise would be to deprive a defendant of his right to a jury trial
and allow for a judge to preliminarily convict a defendant of the crime on
which he was charged. This Court is unwilling to extend [forfeiture] to al
low in the testimony of a decedent victim for whose death a defendant is
58
on trial.
While there is some appeal to this argument, it is ultimately unconvinc
ing. The judge, in making a finding of forfeiture, is not declaring a
defendant guilty but merely finding that there is sufficient evidence to admit

the contested testimony to the jury.59 The jury still must find a defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before any punishment can be imposed. In
short, "[t]he judge has her job and the ju

� has

its own, and they perform

them in a substantially different manner." The judge's inquiry is merely
evidentiary, reserving for the jury any judgment that the defendant's actions
were criminal. Judges are frequently called upon to make preliminary find
ings that are identical to jury issues. For example, a majority of states do not
61
require a grand jury to issue an indictment in felony cases. They allow
judges to make preliminary determinations of probable cause to believe a
62
defendant committed the very crime for which she will later stand trial.
The Supreme Court also has approved of a trial court's predicate finding that
a conspiracy existed even when one of the underlying crimes before the jury
63
was the existence of the same conspiracy. In light of these common prac
tices, there is no merit to the objection that courts should not determine
preliminary matters that are identical to the ultimate issues that a jury will
confront.
That courts rarely voice a concern with forfeiture's reflexive application
when witness tampering is involved provides strong evidence that when
courts do object they are doing so, not because reflexive application is in
herently objectionable, but for different reasons. Addressing Question 3 will
help reveal those reasons.

3.

A Broader Application of Reflexive Forfeiture

Courts have been extremely reluctant to answer Question 3 in the af
firmative because, I argue, the evidence of forfeiture's occurrence is usually
relatively weak. That is, there is no conceptual reason to reject forfeiture in
a case like this-as courts often argue-it is just that there usually is not
strong evidence that forfeiture actually occurred.

58.

United States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 426 (E.D. Va. 2002).

59.

See Friedman, Chutl[)a, supra note 8, at 522-23.

60.

See FRIEDMAN, EVIDENCE, supra note 27, at 269-70.

61.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 14.2(d) (2d ed. 1992).

62.

See id.

63.

See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
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Question 3 asks whether V1's statement, "D shot me," can be admitted
against D in his trial for murderingV1 based on a forfeiture finding. Forfei

64

ture had never been applied in this manner before Crawford. However, in
the brief time since Crawford was decided, a number of courts have recon
65
sidered this application of forfeiture, a small majority have endorsed it, and
66
the California Supreme Court has taken it under review. In the case most
similar to the one posed in Question 3, a police officer responded to a report
that a shooting had occurred and found James Green wounded and laying in
67
the street. The officer asked Green who shot him, and Green responded,
"Meeks shot me." Less than two hours later, before he could be questioned
68
any further on the matter, Green was pronounced dead. The court held that
forfeiture applied in this situation and approved of the statement's admission
against Meeks at his trial for Green's murder. This third case differs from
the first two insofar as the victim did not witness any prior crime, and forfei
ture is being applied on the sole ground that the defendant wrongly caused
his victim's unavailability.
The only objections courts make to applying forfeiture in this third type
of case are unpersuasive. Courts have made one of tw o---or both
objections to applying forfeiture under these circumstances:

(1)

forfeiture

does not apply because the defendant's motive was not to make the witness
69
unavailable, and (2) it does not apply because it would be improper to ap
70
ply the rule reflexively. But, as I have argued, both of these objections are
64. See Flanagan, supra note 9, at 483 (surveying opinions, and noting that none of them
stood for "the broader principle that responsibility for the witness's absence . . . would be a waiver
of constitutional and evidentiary rights.") However, I disagree with Flanagan's description that the
cases all require a specific intent to prevent a witness from testifying at trial, since the courts often
gloss over or skip the intent inquiry entirely. See, e.g., United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926
(8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an argument that forfeiture requires this specific intent, countering that "it
establishes the general proposition that a defendant may not benefit from his or her wrongful pre
vention of future testimony from a witness or potential witness.").
65. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (listing the post-Crawford cases to con
sider the issue and grouping them based on how each has come down on the matter).
66. People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal.
Dec. 22, 2004).
67.

State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 792 (Kan. 2004).

68.

Id.

69. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, No. Crim. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *5 (D.
Colo. Mar. 3, 2005) ("The Doctrine as codified applies [only] to actions whose purpose is to prevent
the testimony."); Wyatt v. State, 981 P.2d 109, 115 n.11 (Alaska 1999) ("The cases espousing this
rule all involve a defendant who has intentionally acted to silence an individual in order to prevent
the witness from testifying . . ."); People v. Maher, 654 N.Y.S. 2d 1004, 1007 (1997) ("[The] excep
tion cannot be invoked where, as in the instant case, there is not a scintilla of evidence that the
defendant's acts against the absent witness were motivated, even in part, by a desire to prevent the
victim from testifying against him in court."); Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1062 n. 4
(Pa. 2001) (holding that forfeiture "only applies when a party's wrongdoing is done with the inten
tion of making the declarant unavailable to testify as a witness.").
70. See, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 426 (E.D. Va. 2002) (refusing to
apply forfeiture reflexively because it would "deprive a defendant of his right to a jury trial and
allow for a judge to preliminarily convict a defendant of the crime on which he was charged "); State
v. Jarzbek, 529 A.2d 1245, 1253 (Conn. 1987) (refusing to apply forfeiture because, "although the
threats made by the defendant against the minor victim were . . . designed to conceal his wrongdo-
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foreclosed. Preoccupation with a defendant's motives in these cases ignores
71
and courts frequently decide is
72
sues that are identical to the questions a jury must face. Not only are these
two objections unpersuasive, but they are almost uniformly rejected when
73
ever a case involving witness tampering arises.
Why are courts, in answering Question 3 in the negative, relying on two
the equitable underpinnings of forfeiture,

justifications that are transparently weak a nd typically rejected in answering
Questions

1

and 2 in the affirmative? The a nswer is that this third type of

case is fairly common and the evidence that the defendant did commit the
wrongdoing at hand is typically weaker because of the underlying circum
stances. While there is no principled objection to forfeiture's reflexive
application, there is an evidentiary explanation for why courts have been
reluctant to accept it.
B.

An Evidentiary Explanation for the Discrepancies

In the third type of case there is usually less convincing evidence that
forfeiture actually occurred, and that provides the best explanation for the
above discrepancies in forfeiture's application. The hypothetical situation
we have been considering illustrates this point . Remember that, as previ
ously explained, we can expect that both ofV2's statements will be admitted
based on a finding of forfeiture, whereas the admissibility ofV,'s statement
is more questionable. The reason for this discrepancy has nothing to do with
concerns about the defendant's motives or reflexive application of forfeiture.
It is simply that we have significantly better evidence suggesting that D ac

tually killedVr This may be a surprising statement, as the hypothetical was
sketched so thinly that it is no doubt difficult to detect the disparity in the

amount of evidence. In fact, the opposite appears to be true, since V1 's
statement, "D shot me," looks to be

more

probative of what it asserts than

V/s speculative statement, "D threatened to kill me if I cooperate with the
police."
But even the thinly sketched circumstances we have provide much
stronger evidence that D actually killedV2:V/s statement, while unambigu
ous and nonspeculative, has absolutely nothing to corroborate D's identity
as the killer. To find that D actually killed V" a judge would have to rely
entirely on V/s assertion of that fact. This is especially problematic after

Crawford, which teaches that the

Confrontation Clause will not allow judges

to accept such testimonial statements at face value if they have not been

ing, they were made during the commission of the very crimes with which he is charged"); Maher,
654 N.Y.S. 2d at 1007 (finding forfeiture's application "is even more anomalous where, as here, it is
invoked against a defendant in the very trial in which the charge is murder of the unavailable wit
ness ").
71.

See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.

72.

See supra Part Il.A.2.

73.

See supra Parts II.A.I, 11.A.2.
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74
confronted. Conversely, in addition toV/s speculative statement implicat
ing D, there is strong corroborating evidence that D killed Yr D was on
trial, V2 was a key witness against D in that trial, and just beforeV2 was to
testify she was murdered. I suspect that most people confronted with these
circumstances would preliminarily conclude that D killedV2, or was at least
involved in the murder, even had V2 never made the speculative accusation.
To be clear, I am not claiming that these circumstances alone are enough to
find beyond a reasonable doubt--or under any other standard of proof-that
D murderedV2• The claim is only that they are highly probative of that fact,
and there is no similar corroborating evidence to suggest that D killedV1 •

Strong evidence such as this will typically exist t o support a forfeiture
finding in witness-tampering cases by the very nature of the circumstances
that underlie them. One court, faced with a standard witness-tampering case,
was not at all concerned about the lack of any material evidence. In that
case, a defendant stood trial for various drug offenses, and the principal wit
ness against him was killed on his way to the courthouse to testify. In
holding that the defendant was probably responsible for the witness's death,
Judge Jack B. Weinstein did not see the need to dig too deeply:

I was warranted in finding that this defendant . . . either directly arranged
for the killing of the witness or was advised of the possible killing of the
witness and acquiesced. He was the only person that could gain from it
. . . . It just is inconceivable . . . that this radical step to aid Mastrangelo,
who is the only person that could have been helped by killing this witness,
75
would have been taken without his knowledge, acquiescence, or orders.
That a witness was at one point willing to testify against a defendant, but
suddenly became unavailable, just happens to be strong evidence that the
defendant took some intermediate action to procure the witness's unavail
ability.
The reason why courts repeatedly offer the two deficient objections re
garding a defendant's motives and forfeiture's reflexive application when
confronted with the third type of case-instead of simply declaring that
there is insufficient evidence to make a forfeiture finding-is tough to de
termine. The best explanation is that there may be sufficient evidence in a
particular case, but courts are worried about extending forfeiture outside of
the classic witness-intimidation realm because of broader implications for
how the rule is applied. I do not claim they are conscious of this behavior,
merely that they are often unwilling to give due consideration to arguments
in favor of expanding forfeiture because it is easiest to keep it limited to a
In overturning what had been the prevailing framework for more than two decades, the
74.
Court described the flaws in that framework as "allow[ing] a jury to hear evidence, untested by the
adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability . . . . thus replac[ing] the
constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one." Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). The difficulties with such a finding are discussed further in
terms of bootstrapping evidence, infra Part ill.B.2.
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 271 (2d Cir. 1 <?32) (quoting Judge
75.
Weinstein's trial findings). Judge Weinstein also noted the "neutral" demeanor of the defendant
upon hearing the announcement that the witness had been killed. Id.
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circumscribed set of facts. There is evidence of this concern in several
76
cases. These courts are not objecting to forfeiture's reflexive application on
any principled basis, but only on the grounds that the rule should be applied
narrowly and only in cases where the evidence of forfeiture is rather strong.
Limiting the rule's application to witness-tampering cases achieves both
these goals. They are relatively rare and will inherently have a fairly strong
evidentiary basis for a forfeiture finding, as explained above. However, it
should not be too difficult to fashion coherent rules that would achieve these
goals more effectively and consistently.
III. How E XPANSIVE FORFEITURE CouLD B ECOME A N D SOME PROPOSED
LIMITATIONS

Expanding forfeiture beyond witness-tampering cases leaves us with a
much simpler equitable doctrine. While the sentiment that forfeiture should
apply infrequently and only when there is strong evidence of its occurrence
is a good one, it would be better realized with limitations that are designed
to consistently achieve that end. Part III.A offers a further exploration of the
equitable doctrine of forfeiture envisioned here, and in Part IIl.B I offer two
proposed limitations. The two I offer-regarding a narrow interpretation of
unavailability and a bar on testimonial bootstrapping-are merely first at
tempts at fashioning coherent limiting principles.
A.

The New A pproach to Foifeiture and Its Implications

Doing away with the formal constraints that pervaded forfeiture's appli
cation before

Crawford

leaves us with a much simpler equitable doctrine.

Under the forfeiture doctrine envisioned here, a defendant should not prevail
on a Confrontation Clause objection if her wrongful conduct caused the in
ability to cross-examine a witness. The Sixth Circuit recently endorsed a
very similar view, indicating that under the doctrine a "defendant may not
sustain a Confrontation Clause objection if the defendant is responsible for
77
the declarant's unavailability at trial."
There are two caveats to that articulation that should be recognized.
First, forfeiture should apply only when the defendant's conduct is wrong
ful. A defendant who claims a privilege to keep a spouse from testifying, for

76. See United States v. Jordan, No. Crim. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 5 1 350 1 at *6 (D. Colo.
Mar. 3, 2005) (rejecting application of the rule as it could lead to its application "broadly . . . in any
murder case."); State v. Jarzbek, 529 A.2d 1 245, 1253 (Conn. 1987) ("The constitutional right of
confrontation would have little force, however, if we were to find an implied waiver of that right in
every instance where the accused, in order to silence his victim, uttered threats during the commis
sion of the crime for which he is on trial."); People v. Maher, 654 N.Y.S. 2d 1004, 1007 (1997
(rejecting reflexive application of the rule in part because it would "swallow up the narrowly drawn
traditional dying declaration hearsay exception").
77. United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 916 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., dissenting). While
the Arnold majority did not consider the forfeiture issue, since it was not briefed, this statement
merely reflects what the Sixth Circuit found in United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364 (6th Cir.
2005).
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78
instance, could be said to have caused the witness 's unavailability, but not
in a way inconsistent with maintaining the right to confrontation. Indeed,

Crawford would have

feiture

had a different outcome had the Court envisioned for

as

applying to rightful conduct that caused a witness's
79
unavailability.
Second, even where a defendant does not directly cause a witness's un
availability, forfeiture may still apply if the defendant's wrongful conduct
caused his inability to cross-examine the witness. For instance, if a defen
dant remains a fugitive until all witnesses against him die of natural causes,
although he certainly did not cause the witnesses' deaths, forfeiture should
still apply because he caused his inability to cross-examine them. Two re
cent cases involved a defendant who absconded, remained a fugitive for a
number of years, and by the time he was captured a crucial witness against
80
him died or was deported. While both courts-adhering to unduly rigid
definitions of what it means to cause a witness's unavailability without
much analysis-found that forfeiture did not apply under these circum
stances, that result is unjustified. While it is a stretch to say the defendants
caused the witnesses' unavailability-since neither was involved with the
death or deportation of the witnesses-we can say that their wrongful con
duct caused their inability to cross examine the witnesses. It seems clear that
causing one's own inability to cross-examine is what lies at the heart of the
forfeiture rule. One foreseeable consequence of absconding for a prolonged
period of time is that the witnesses you would want to confront may not be
available when you are eventually brought to trial. That should be enough to
dismiss any objection the defendants might raise under the Confrontation
Clause with regard to the absent witnesses.
This reconceived rule of forfeiture has the unfortunate potential to put a
substantial dent in the confrontation right. One commentator noted that it
"could lead to the unavailability of confrontation in entire categories of
81
cases." While that is a mischaracterization-as forfeiture applies only to
particular witnesses and never to cases entirely-it would be accurate to say
t hat forfeiture threatens to eliminate a defendant's right to confront

the vic

tim in entire categories of prosecutions. The most obvious category is
homicide prosecutions. If the applicable standard of proof for finding forfei-

78. Cf Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 n.1 (1999) (plurality opinion) (assuming that the
valid invocation of a Fifth Amendment privilege establishes unavailability).
79. It was Sylvia Crawford's out-of-court testimony implicating her husband that was at
issue in the case. It is fair to say that Michael Crawford caused her unavailability at trial, since he
refused to waive his spousal privilege. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 ("Sylvia did not testify because
of the state marital privilege, which generally bars a spouse from testifying without the other
spouse's consent.") (citation omitted).
80. See People v. Melchor, No. 1-03-3036, 2005 WL 1522715 (Ill. App. Ct. June 28, 2005)
(witness died); State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699 (N.M. 2004) (witness was deported).
81.

Andrew

C.

Fine,

a

criminal

defense

lawyer,

posted

this

comment

on

The Confrontation Blog, at http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2004/12/forfeiture-and-dying
declarations.html#comments (no date provided) (last visited July 24, 2005). The comment was in
response to the "Forfeiture and Dying Declarations" post and was made at 5:35 p.m.
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82
ture is a preponderance o f the evidence-as most courts have held -then
forfeiture will almost always bar a homicide defendant's Confrontation
Clause objections to the admission of the victim's testimony. Without a pre
ponderance of the evidence suggesting that the defendant killed the victim
and thereby made her unavailable, the evidence is likely insufficient to try
83
the defendant for homicide in the first place. Likewise, prosecutors c an
make colorable arguments that forfeiture should apply whenever a defen
dant's crime could be said to have scared or intimidated the victim from
4
8
testifying at trial. This will be especially applicable in cases involving do
mestic abuse, sexual assault or any other "naturally intimidating offense"
85
that might have the effect of keeping a victim from testifying.
The prospect of a severely diminished confrontation right in these
prosecutions where confrontation is most vital--due to the severity of the
6
punishments and the heavy reliance on victim testimon -is not an en
tirely welcome one. We should therefore hope to discover some principled

/

limitations on the rule.

82.

See supra note

43;

see also State v.

Hale, 691 N.W. 2d 637, 653 (Wis. 2005) (Prosser,

J.,

concurring) (surveying cases that apply the preponderance standard).
83.

See Fine, supra note 8 1 :

When the ultimate issue is involved, a judge will almost always have found, before trial, that
the prosecution's evidence establishes defendant's guilt by a preponderance of the evidence,
either by finding probable cause to hold the defendant after a preliminary hearing, or by
finding the evidence presented to a grand jury to be legally sufficient.

But see United

States v. Miller, 1 1 6 F.3d 64 1 , 669 (2d Cir. 1 997), where the court drew a somewhat

plausible distinction:

A grand jury's indictment is based on probable cause, not on a preponderance of the evidence,
and that body makes its judgment after an ex pane proceeding at which the target of its inquiry
is normally not permitted to call or cross-examine witnesses. The grand jury's conclusion, after
such a proceeding, that there is probable cause to indict a defendant for murder is not an ac
ceptable surrogate for a court's finding, after a hearing at which both sides have the
opportunity to be heard, that the defendant's responsibility for that murder is established by a
preponderance of the evidence.
84.

For a further discussion of these issues, see Friedman,

Chutl/}a, supra

note 8, at 527-35

(discussing the implications of this rule for severely battered victims and child victims of sexual
abuse).
85.
See Chris Hutton, Sir Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Coun Re-Vamps Two Dec
ades of Confrontation Clause Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REV. 4 1 , 71 (2005)
(pointing out that in these cases, "[t]he all-too-frequent recantations and refusals to testify [may be
attributable] to the defendant's wrongdoing"); Tom Harbinson, Using the Crawford v. Washington

"Forfeiture by Wrongdoing " Confrontation Clause Exception in Child Abuse Cases, REASONABLE
Vol.
1,
Num.
3
(2004),
available at http://www.ndaa-apri .org/publications/

EFFORTS,

newsletters/reasonable_efforts_volume_l_number_3_2004.html ("If the accused's acts are respon
sible for the child being in a condition where the child refuses to testify, states she cannot remember,
or becomes non-responsive, the requirement of unavailability should
(citations omitted); Krischer,

supra note

be considered to be met.")

37, at 1 5- 1 6 ("Domestic violence is not an event, but ongo

ing, systematic abuse. Prosecutors must educate their judges that the domestic violence itself may
have procured the victim's unavailability.").
86.
See Neal A. Hudders, Note, The Problem of Using Hearsay in Domestic Violence Cases:
ls a New Exception the Answer?, 49 DUKE L. J. 1 04 1 , 1 060-6 1 (2000) (noting that domestic abuse
usually takes place in private with few witnesses, such that "the prosecution of domestic violence
cases can only be effective if the . . . statements of the victim are admissible at trial").
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Two Suggested Limitations

Limitations on the rule of forfeiture clearly should not be eliminated en
tirely; they should just be recalibrated. As discussed earlier, what had
motivated courts to restrict forfeiture to witness-tampering cases was the
sentiment that forfeiture should apply ( 1) infrequently and (2) only upon a
87
showing of strong evidence of its occurrence. While the sentiment has
merit, it should be realized in a more principled way than confining forfei
ture to witness-tampering cases. Two limitations that could achieve the
above goals are to apply forfeiture (1) only upon a showing that the witness
is "genuinely unavailable," which occurs infrequently, and (2) only when
there is substantial evidence independent of the unconfronted testimonial
statement at issue that forfeiture occurred, which requires strong evidence.
This second proposed limitation is essentially a call to revive the rule
88
against bootstrapping when testimonial statements are at issue. The argu
ment is not that these limitations are constitutionally required-although
that ultimately may be true. My more humble suggestion is that recognizing
these limitations would allay the legitimate concerns of judges and com
mentators who are worried about the frequency and evidentiary strength of
forfeiture findings, and would do so in a more principled way than limiting
forfeiture to witness-intimidation cases.
1. A

Narrow Interpretation of Unavailability

Requiring that a witness be unavailable in a strict sense would help con
fine forfeiture to relatively few cases. There is no question that homicide
victims are unavailable for cross-examination, but determining unavailabil
ity in domestic and sexual abuse cases is a more difficult task. Studies on the
willingness of domestic abuse victims to testify against their abusers indi
cate that up to eighty percent of them seek to dismiss charges against their
89
90
abusers, while as few as four percent are actively willing to testify. As the
Second Circuit put it, a witness who is "so fearful that he will not testify or
will testify falsely is just as unavailable as a witness who is dead or cannot
91
be found."
Since domestic abuse is an intimidating offense, victims of
which are typically unwilling to testify, one could mistakenly conclude that
in nearly every domestic violence case, the defendant has forfeited his right
87.

See supra Part 11.B.

88. I use the word "revive" because the rule against bootstrapping had been accepted for
decades until 1 987, when Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, all but obliterated it. See infm
Part ill. B.2.

89. David M. Gersten, Evidentiary Trends in Domestic Violence, 72 FLA. B.J. 65, 67 n.3
(1998) (indicating that fifty to eighty percent of victims seek to dismiss the charges).
90. Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing Effec
tive Prosecution Stmtegies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships, 1 5
HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 1 3 9 n.108 (1991). For a discussion o f this issue that speaks o f the trend more
broadly than Asmus's targeted study, see generally EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (3d ed. 2003).
91.

Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6, 9 (2d Cir 2000) (citation and quotation omitted).
.
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to confront the victim. In the wake of

Crawford,

619
this has prompted one at

torney to brazenly declare, "[d]omestic violence almost always involves
92
forfeiture."
It would be a mistake to extend forfeiture to cases in which the witness
may genuinely be available to testify, as

Crawford

evinces a preference for

in-court testimony and cross-examination whenever possible. The Supreme
Court has noted that complying with a forum's evidence rules with regard to
93
unavailability may not satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns, but exactly
what is required is unclear. It might be that the Confrontation Clause re
quires only a "good faith" effort by a prosecutor to obtain a witness's live
94
testimony, but such a malleable standard is hardly illuminating.
What constitutes "genuine unavailability" is a tough question, but at the
very least it should mean that the witness refuses to testify even when faced
95
with a court order, as the Federal Rules require. It should not extend to
cases where the witness is willing to take the stand but will explicitly recant
96
any prior accusations. In those circumstances, the prosecutor will typically
have the opportunity to impeach the witness with prior testimony and let the
jury draw whatever conclusions it will. Given what is at stake, an argument
could be made that the witness must be physically incapable of testifying
before being considered unavailable in this context , but that is probably too
harsh a limitation. There is some thoughtful scholarship on the question of
97
when a witness should be considered unavailable, although it is not exactly
98
clear how Crawford will impact such analysis. It is enough to say that, in
this context, unavailability should be defined in a way that will require
99
prosecutors to exhaust all reasonable means to obtain live testimony.

92.

Krischer, supra note 37, at 14.

93.

Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).

94. Id. at 724-25. While this standard has garnered some consensus, it really only begs sev
eral other questions regarding what constitutes a good faith effort in light of the protections of the
Sixth Amendment.
95.

See FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(2).

96. But see Geraci, 211 F.3d at 7-9 (affirming the application of forfeiture where the witness
was willing to take the stand, but would only recant his prior account of the event at issue).
97. See, e.g. , Richard D. Friedman, Remote Testimony, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 695, 70811 (2002); Barbara Rook Snyder, Defining the Contours of Unavailability and Reliability for the
Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 189 (1993).
98. See Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569,
589-90 (2004 ). Jeffrey L. Fisher also notes in his outline of post Crawford cases, with regard to
unavailability, "Crawford does not appear to change this law, but it makes it much more important."
Crawford v. Washington: Reframing the Right to Confrontation, http://www.dwt.com/lawdir/
publications/CrawfordOutline.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
-

99.
This tracks some language in the Federal Rules of Evidence, stating that unavailability
applies when the proponent of a declaration could not produce the declarant "by process or other
reasonable means." FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(5). The suggestion here is simply that we should require a
fairly high bar for what constitutes "reasonable means." Given the difficulty with making that as
sessment, the rule should likely intrude into instances where a prosecutor did make all reasonable
attempts to obtain a witness but failed. That is, the rule will probably have to be overly broad (e.g.,
requiring that a witness be physically incapable of testifying) in order to provide prosecutors with fit
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The exact parameters of this limitation are not of too much concern
here, though, as it is enough to notice that the limitation-whatever form it
may take-is far more principled than limiting forfeiture to witness
intimidation cases. This limitation is based on the preference for in-court
testimony and on keeping overzealous prosecutors from bypassing that pref
erence by arguing forfeiture in every case. It provides clear incentives for
prosecutors to do everything in their power to produce their witnesses at
trial, in accordance with the principles underlying the Confrontation Clause.
It does not draw unworkable distinctions between witness intimidation and
other types of cases.

2. A Rule against the Bootstrapping of Testimony
The second proposed limitation is that, in making a predicate finding of
forfeiture, a court should place minimal reliance on the unconfronted testi
monial evidence at issue. At the very . least, a court should not make a
forfeiture finding based solely on unconfronted testimony. The practice of
considering a contested statement as evidence of its own admissibility is
100
known as bootstrapping.
For a time, bootstrapping was uniformly prohib
101
ited.
But following Bourjailf v. United States in 1987, it was essentially
10
an unobjectionable practice.
In that case, the Supreme Court explicitly
permitted trial courts to engage in bootstrapping when co-conspirator state
103
ments, are at issue.
That is, a court is allowed to consider an alleged co
conspirator's statement as evidence that a conspiracy did exist, and thereby
admit the same statement at trial based on the co-conspirator exception to

the rule against hearsay. 104 After recognizing that its prior holdings coun
seled against bootstrapping, the court found that those holdings were

incentives for obtaining witnesses. While I do regret that I do not have a firmer or better developed
opinion on the matter, I hope it is contribution enough to raise the issue in this context.
100.
The term refers to a piece of evidence "lift[ing) itself by its own bootstraps to the level of
competent evidence." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942). For instance, when a wit
ness's unconfronted testimony is, "D is the one who fatally injured me," and a defendant objects that
it should not be admitted because it violates the Confrontation Clause, a judge who considers that
statement as evidence that the defendant forfeited his confrontation right has bootstrapped the evi
dence insofar as she has allowed it to provide the basis for its own admissibility. See generally
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
Sometimes the practice of a judge deciding, as a preliminary matter, the same issue that will be
decided at trial is referred to as bootstrapping. This is not how I use the term here, as I have no ob
jection to that practice. See supra notes 58--03 and accompanying text.
101.
See Glasser, 315 U.S. at 74-75; see also Patrick J. Sullivan, Note, Bootstrapping of
Hearsay Under Federal Rule of Evidence 80J(d)(2)(E): Funher Erosion of the Coconspirator Ex
emption, 74 IOWA L. REV. 467, 482-83 nn.96-101 (1989).
102.

See 483 U.S. at 180-81.

103.
Id. at 180 ("We think that there is little doubt that a co-conspirator's statements could
themselves be probative of the existence of a conspiracy and the participation of both the defendant
and the declarant in the conspiracy.").
104.
See FED. R. Evm. 80l (d)(2)(E). To be more precise, the Federal Rules hold that state
ments made by co-conspirators in furtherance of a conspiracy are not excepted from the rule against
hearsay-as exceptions can be found in Rules 803 and 804--but are not hearsay at all.
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1 05
However, Crawford rejects
superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence.
the position that the Federal Rules dictate the constitutional content of the
106
While
Confrontation Clause, and thereby calls Bourjaily into question.
bootstrapping is clearly allowed when ordinary hearsay is concerned, Craw

ford's new framework raises some serious doubts as to its permissibility
1 70
when testimonial statements are involved.
Crawford explicitly abrogated a process where testimonial statements
1 08
were admitted "based on a mere judicial determination of reliability."
In
deed, the Court endorsed the rule of forfeiture on the basis that "it does not
109
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability."
However,
when a judge relies on a testimonial statement as evidence of its own truth
in making a forfeiture finding, it would be an obvious fiction to say that for
feiture does not purport to be a means of determining reliability.
Revisiting our Question 3, a judge faced with that scenario could find
forfeiture only if she found that V , 's statement, "D shot me," was wholly
reliable. Recall that the issue is whether V 's statement can be used against
1
D in his trial for shooting V , . Furthermore, let us assume that this is the only
11 0
significant evidence that implicates D in V , 's murder.
While Part II oper
ated on the assumption that there was sufficient evidence for a judge to find
forfeiture, the issue posed here is what evidence the judge should consider
when making the finding. If a judge relied on the unconfronted statement to
make a finding of forfeiture, it would be the functional equivalent of admit
ting testimony based on a judicial determination of its reliability, as

"'

expressly prohibited in Crawford.
Therefore, it would be tough to square
Crawford with unfettered bootstrapping in cases like this.
Unfortunately, my analysis here is doomed to circular reasoning. If our
hypothetical defendant complained to a judge about this form of bootstrap
ping, the conversation would probably develop as follows:

D: You should not consider V,'s testimony when determining forfeiture, as I
have not had the chance to confront him about it.
Judge: But that is your own fault, as you caused V, 's unavailability by kill
ing him, so you cannot now complain of your inability to confront him.

105.

Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 1 80-83.

106. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) ("[W]e do not think the Framers meant
to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence . . . ).
"

107. Co-conspirator statements will almost categorically not be testimonial. It would be very
difficult for a statement to be made in furtherance of a conspiracy and in anticipation that it will be
used at trial. While I have not argued for any particular view of what constitutes a testimonial state
ment, it seems fairly certain that co-conspirators acting in furtherance of their plot are not bearing
witness. This was discussed at some length during the oral arguments in Crawford. Transcript of
Oral Argument at 14-16, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-94 10).
108.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.

109.

Id.

1 1 0. Of course, there will always be some other evidence. For instance, that V, even knew D's
name will count as some corroborating evidence, it is just not very significant.
1 1 1.

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 6 1-62.
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D: There is no evidence that I killed VJ other than his testimony, which is

precisely what I have a right to confront. I cannot be deprived of my
right to confront him based on the very statement that is constitutionally
inadmissible.
Judge: But forfeiture provides an exception to your confrontation right, and
having found that the exception applies here, you cannot complain
about my consideration of the testimonial statement.
D: You only made that finding based on the very statement that I should

have had a right to confront !
The debate has reached an impasse, as both the judge and the defendant
are arguing in circles.
In light of how critical confronting adverse witnesses is to a fair trial
and given

Crawford's

affirmation of that right when testimony is con

cerned-the circle must be broken in favor of the defendant. That is the only
way to give the Confrontation Clause meaning in these contexts. If VJ 's
statement, "D shot me," can furnish the basis of its own admissibility and
then be used to convict the defendant, the confrontation right would become
empty in these situations. An unconfronted accusation could be enough to
convict a defendant, and the Confrontation Clause clearly counsels against
that outcome. The better rule after

Crawford is

that an unconfronted testi

monial statement cannot furnish the basis for a forfeiture finding absent
"substantial independent evidence." That is, substantial evidence other than
the contested testimonial statement.
While a fair conclusion from the above discussion is that the judge
should be absolutely prohibited from considering unconfronted testimony in
making forfeiture findings, such a bright line is unnecessary. A "substantial
independent evidence" test is better than an absolute prohibition on boot
11 2
strapping for two, largely pragmatic reasons.
First, given how difficult it is
for judges to discount evidence entirely, it will usually be inaccurate to de
scribe a judge as giving

no

weight to evidence that she is aware of if it is

largely on point. It would be better if the rule recognized this fact and sim
ply required that the judge's finding be based substantially on independent
evidence-evidence independently sufficient for a forfeiture finding-to
circumvent concerns that judges should not even be exposed to evidence
they are prohibited from considering. Second, this rule will also make the
job of reviewing courts easier while remaining consistent with the concerns
expressed here. Rather than asking reviewing courts to probe the record for
evidence that a trial j udge considered prohibited evidence when finding for
feiture,

it would be easier to

ask if the independent evidence was

1 1 2. Of course, what this amounts to is that a judge can bootstrap only in those situations
where bootstrapping would be ostensibly unnecessary. It is like responding to a thirsty man's cries
for water by saying, "I would gladly give you a glass of water if only you were not so thirsty." But,
for reasons considered infra, it does not mean that the distinction between this "substantial inde
pendent evidence" test and an absolute prohibition on bootstrapping is meaningless.
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1 13
sufficient.
These two considerations are not the most compelling and per
haps there are overriding reasons to prefer an absolute prohibition on
bootstrapping testimony. But, again, the goal here is not to sketch any par
ticularly robust limiting principles; it is to show there are principled w ays of
constraining forfeiture to meet the concerns that courts have displayed.
What is problematic is depriving the confrontation right of any real
meaning by allowing testimonial statements to lift themselves into admissi
bility. This concern is dispelled so long as they are not given significant
weight and are supported by substantial evidence. For instance, recall the
114
case described above,
in which the victim's unconfronted state
ment, "Meeks shot me," was used against the defendant on the basis of a

Meeks

forfeiture finding. In addition to that statement, the trial court heard four
witnesses who watched the fight between Meeks and Green, all of whom
1 15

heard gunshots and saw Meeks standing over Green directly thereafter.
With this independent evidence, a judge could disregard the testimonial

statement and still find that forfeiture occurred. In cases like this, bootstrap
ping would not run afoul of

Crawford,

as the independent evidence makes

the forfeiture finding noticeably different from a mere judicial proclamation
that the statements are reliable.
While

Bourjaily

held that the Federal Rules of Evidence abrogated the

rule against bootstrapping with regard to ordinary hearsay, now that the dis
tinction between testimony and hearsay is recognized,

a "substantial

independent evidence" test should be applied when testimonial statements
are at issue. Interestingly, a rule similar to the one proposed here prevailed
1 16
before Bourjaily.
In United States v. Nixon, addressing the bootstrapping
problem with regard to co-conspirator statements, the Court stated, "As a
preliminary matter, there must be substantial, independent evidence of the
1 17
conspiracy, at least enough to take the question to the jury."
Only with this
requirement in place could a finding of forfeiture be meaningfully different
from a mere determination of the reliability of unconfronted testimony.
1 18
One might respond that confrontation is a trial right -not extended to
pretrial proceedings-making this argument unorthodox, as it contemplates
a Confrontation Clause violation where the judge considers unconfronted
testimony at a preliminary hearing. But the pretrial right envisioned here is
essential to giving the confrontation right meaning at trial. It is limited to the
rare occasion when the pretrial question requires determining the reliability
of a testimonial statement, and the result of the finding is to admit the same

1 1 3. Perhaps this goal could also be achieved by limiting reviewing courts to a more restricted
review, such as a harmless error analysis.
1 14.

State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004); see supra notes 70-7 1 and accompanying text.

1 1 5.

Id. at 794-95.

1 1 6.

Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 1 7 1 (1987).

1 1 7.

418 U.S. 683, 702 n. 1 4 ( 1 974).

1 1 8. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52-53 (1 987) (noting that the Confrontation
Clause does not force the government to provide the accused with confrontation at pretrial proceed
ings).
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unconfronted testimony into evidence at trial. Without this pretrial confron
tation right, the trial right would be too easily circumvented, as an
unconfronted statement could lift itself into admissibility based on a forfei
1 19
ture finding , thereby bypassing confrontation safeguards altogether.
While this argument has probably raised more questions than it has an
swered, the goal here is only to define some principled means of limiting
1 20
forfeiture findings to cases where strong evidence exists.
This proposed
rule against bootstrapping addresses the unfairness of using evidence that
has not yet been shown to be trustworthy through the constitutionally pre
scribed method of confrontation against a defendant. Similarly, requiring
that a witness be genuinely unavailable helps realize the preference for in
court testimony whenever possible. With these two limitations in place ,
courts could rest assured that forfeiture will not swallow up the Confronta
tion Clause, as it would apply only in rare cases and upon a showing of
substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
My conclusions conflict somewhat with regard to just how expansively
forfeiture should apply. If equity is the guiding concern, as

Crawford

indi

cates, then forfeiture should preclude a Confrontation Clause objection
whenever a defendant's wrongful conduct causes a witness's unavailability.
This should increase forfeiture's importance in more run-of-the-mill crimi
nal

cases,

including

homicide

and

domestic

abuse

cases

where

an

unavailable victim gave prior testimony. While limiting the rule to witness
tampering cases is unjustifiable, I share the worry with many courts · that
expanding forfeiture further could result in an impoverished confrontation
right. But the answer cannot be to stand by an indefensible distinction be
tween witness intimidation and other types of cases. Instead, breaking down
the cases that address forfeiture reveals that the meaningful objections to
expanding forfeiture are directed at the breadth of the exception and its evi
dentiary support.
Taking these objections to heart, we might begin to formulate more
principled limitations to the rule of forfeiture. I believe the two limitations
proposed here-focused on declarant unavailability and testimonial boot
strapping-would help alleviate the concerns about forfeiture swallowing up
the confrontation right. They directly address the frequency and evidentiary
strength of forfeiture findings and can be derived from the themes underly1 19. After Crawford, it is worth revisiting other circumstances where a pretrial right of con
frontation might exist. The topic is one that I have not thought enough about to offer any views
beyond the narrow ones already given.
1 20. Perhaps a more straightforward way of achieving this would be to require a higher stan
dard of proof for forfeiture findings. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. Unit B
1982) (requiring clear and convincing evidence); People v. Maher, 654 N.Y.S. 2d 1004, 1007 ( 1 997)
("Because of the weighty countervailing interests, that is, the constitutional right of confrontation
. . . we imposed a clear and convincing evidentiary standard of proof for the establishment of the
factual basis for admitting out-of-court statements of a declarant whose unavailability was caused by
the defendant.").
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and the Confrontation Clause. Nonetheless, they are only first

attempts at addressing concerns that accompany an expansive rule of forfei
ture. There are certainly other limitations that might have the same desired
effect. Recognizing that limiting forfeiture to witness-tampering cases is
unprincipled, and that there are alternative methods to addressing concerns
about forfeiture's expansiveness, is just the first step in revamping the equi

table doctrine. Crawford has provided the occasion to do just that.

626

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.104:599

